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ABSTRACT 
 
The last twenty years recorded the proliferation of the competition law 
regimes in several emerging economies. The article explores the issues related 
to the involvement of the judiciary in the enforcement of the competition law 
in the developing countries, taking Brazil as a case study. During the last 
years the Brazilian competition authority (CADE) pursued an active 
enforcement policy against cartels and other forms of anti-competitive 
conducts. Consequently, a large number of appeals against CADE’s decisions 
were initiated in the Brazilian federal courts. The slowness of the Brazilian 
judicial system and the lack of understanding of competition law by the 
Brazilian courts has hampered the enforcement policy of CADE. A number of 
initiatives have been adopted in the country in order to solve these issues. The 
article critically analyzes these initiatives, and in the conclusion it proposes a 
number of policy lessons for other emerging economies.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays an issue discussed in the majority of the competition law 
jurisdictions around the world concerns the role of the national courts within 
the process of enforcement of the competition policy. The debate concerning 
the standard of review applied by the European Court of First Instance (CFI) 
to the decisions of the European Commission is very well known.1 However, 
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1
 During the last years, in fact, the CFI started to review more carefully the decisions 
adopted by the European Commission in the area of competition law. For instance, in 
the judgement Tetra Laval the ECJ ruled that, although it recognized the Commission 
discretion with regard to the economic assessment of the merger, “that does not mean 
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the question of the standard of review applied by the appellate courts when 
reviewing decisions of the national competition authorities (NCA) is not an 
issue concerning exclusively the European Community. During the last fifteen 
years new competition law jurisdictions have “bloomed” around the world.2 
In particular, several emerging economies in Latin and Central America, 
Eastern Europe, South East Asia and in a number of African States have 
recently adopted a competition law. The latter was perceived as one of those 
policies necessary to establish a market oriented economy.3 The article aims at 
filling this gap in the literature, by analyzing the common problems faced by 
the judiciary of the emerging countries within the enforcement of the 
competition policy,  and by suggesting a number of policy lessons in the 
conclusions of the article.  
Several developing countries have opted for the European civil law 
approach to the enforcement of competition law, rather than the US one.4 The 
European approach mainly relies on a public system of enforcement of the 
competition law, where an independent NCA conducts the investigations and 
it adopts the final decision related to the case. The latter may be appealed 
before an administrative tribunal. The competition agency often acts both as a 
prosecutor and as a judge of first instance. By contrast, the US Department of 
Justice (DoJ) conducts the investigations, but later it has to bring a case before 
a federal court, which would sanction the anti-competitive behaviour. 
                                                                                                                              
that the Community courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s 
interpretation of information of an economic nature” (para. 39). 
In relation to the debate concerning the standard of review applied by the CFI and by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the area of merger control see for instance: 
H. Legal., “Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in EU Competition 
Law”. In B. Hawk (ed.), 2005 Fordham Corporate Law Institute Annual Proceedings 
(Juris Publishing, 2006) 107-116. 
A. Svetlicinii., “Exploring the Role of Legal Presumptions Under the Convincing 
Evidence Standard in EC Merger Control”. (2008) 1 Global Antitrust Review 117-
134. 
C-12/03 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-00987. 
2
 A. B. Lipsky., “The Global Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce 
or Runaway Regulation?” (2002) 26, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 59-68. 
Whish confirms that "more than 100 countries now have competition law".  
R. Whish, “Competition Law. 5th edition”, (Oxford University Press, 2003), 782.  
3
 R. Lande., “Creating Competition Policy for Transition Economies”, (1997-1998) 
23, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 341. 
4
 One author who argues that the European administrative system of competition law 
suits better the developing country than the American one is D. J. Gerber., 
“Implementing Competition Law in Asia: Using European and US Experience”. In U. 
Immenga (ed.), Wirtschafts-und Privatrecht im Spannungfeld von Privatautonomie, 
Wettbewerb und Regulierung,(Verlag C.H. Beck, Germany, 2006) 168-169.  
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Moreover, the number of cases of private enforcement of competition law is 
lower in Europe than in the USA.5 Finally, judges from the common law 
jurisdictions have fewer restraints in interpreting the scope and the objectives 
of the legislations, and thus they can take a more active role in shaping the 
competition policy. One of the reasons for which the majority of the emerging 
economies have opted for the European model of enforcement of the 
competition law is related to the lack of expertise of their national courts in 
the field of competition law. However, even though the role of the courts in 
the enforcement of the competition law in the majority of the emerging 
economies is more limited in comparison to the US tribunals, they can still 
play an important role in reviewing the objectiveness of the NCAs’ decisions. 
At the moment there are few studies in the literature on the role 
played by national courts within the enforcement of the competition law in the 
emerging economies. 6 This lack of interest may be explained by the fact that 
there are relatively few cases of judicial review in the field of competition law 
in the majority of the developing countries, in comparison to the EU or the 
USA. In fact, in the majority of the emerging economies competition law has 
usually remained not enforced for a number of years after its introduction at 
the legislative level. Nevertheless, during the last years competition law has 
started to be more actively enforced in a number of emerging economies in 
different regions of the world. Countries like Mexico, Brazil, Chile, South 
Africa and South Korea are examples of emerging economies where 
competition law is today “aggressively” enforced by the NCAs. The latter 
                                                     
5
 For instance, unlike of the US judges, the European ones cannot grant treble 
damages to compensate the damages caused by an anti-competitive practice. 
Moreover, from a procedural point of view there are limitations to the right of the 
plaintiff to assk the defendant to disclose internal documents during the trial. 
In relation to the reasons which hamper the development of private enforcement of 
competition law in Europe see: A. Renda., “Making Antitrust Damages Action More 
Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios”. Report published on 
21.12.2007 by the Centre for European Policy Studies, the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam and the University Luiss Guido Carlo. Report for the European 
Commission, contract DG COMP/2006/A3/012.  
The text of the report is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html (accessed 
on 10th June 2009). 
6
 One of the few studies conducted in this sector was carried out by the International 
Competition Network (ICN) in 2006. International Competition Network, 
Competition Policy Implementation Working Group, “Competition and the 
Judiciary”. Report published in April 2006.  The text of the report, is available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/library/working-
group/16 (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
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actively conduct investigations on anti-competitive conducts and cartels, 
instead of reviewing only the notified economic concentrations.7 As a 
consequence, the number of the NCA’s decisions appealed to court is 
expected to grow in these countries during the next years. Therefore, the 
national courts will be more and more involved in the enforcement of the 
competition law in these countries. 
 
STRUCTURE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ARTICLE 
 
A number of questions will be discussed throughout the article. The 
first question discussed concerns the standard of review that should be applied 
by the national judges of the developing countries when reviewing the NCA’s 
decisions: should it be limited to procedural aspects or should it also go into 
the merits of the NCA’s decision? Furthermore, how can the NCA promote 
the awareness of competition law among the national judges, who are usually 
not familiar with the economic concepts underpinning the competition law? A 
final question concerns whether the judicial review may be better carried out 
by a single specialized court or by all State tribunals of the country, and which 
are the implications of this institutional choice.  
The article aims at answering these questions through a case study on 
Brazil. In this emerging country a competition law has been enforced for more 
than fifteen years.8 As it will be mentioned in the next section, during the last 
years the Brazilian competition authorities have focussed their attention on the 
detection of cartels. As a consequence, a large number of decisions 
sanctioning private parties have been recently appealed to the Brazilian 
federal courts. In the 1994, the year when the current competition law was 
adopted in Brazil, only seven decisions of the Brazilian NCA were appealed 
                                                     
7
 Further information concerning the enforcement activities of NCAs of these 
countries can be found at: 
- Comisión Federal de Competencia México,  http://www.cfc.gob.mx/english/ 
(accessed on 10th June 2009). 
- Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia (Chile), 
http://www.tdlc.cl/Portal.Base/Web/VerContenido.aspx?ID=286 (accessed on 10th 
June 2009). 
- Conselho Administrativo de Defensa Econômica (Brazil), http://www.cade.gov.br/ 
(accessed on 10th June 2009). 
- Competition Commission (South Africa), http://www.compcom.co.za/   (accessed 
on 10th June 2009). 
- Korea Fair Trade Commission, http://eng.ftc.go.kr/ (accessed on 10th 2009). 
8
 The current competition law enforced in the country was adopted in 1994. 
Lei n. 8.884, adopted on 11.06.1994. The text of the legislation is available at 
http://www.cade.gov.br/legislacao/8884lei.asp (accessed on 10th June.2009).   
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to court; meanwhile, in 2007 there were 460 cases of judicial review in the 
area of competition law in the Brazilian federal courts.9  Nowadays, the 
Brazilian federal courts have to review a large number of appeals against the 
NCA’s decisions, in spite of their lack of knowledge in the field of 
competition law. The case of Brazil will be relied upon to grasp a number of 
lessons applicable to other developing countries, which have just started to 
enforce their competition law in a more active manner. 
The article will deal exclusively with the issue of the judicial review 
carried out by the national courts in the appeal proceedings to the decisions of 
the NCA. The issue of private enforcement of the competition law in the 
emerging economies is out of the scope of this article.  
The case study is based on the analysis of the most relevant 
judgements held by the Brazilian federal courts in the area of competition law 
during the last years. Moreover, another useful source of information have 
been the interviews conducted by the author in June 2008 with a number of 
officers of the Brazilian competition authorities in Brasilia and with some 
competition  lawyers in São Paulo. 
The article will be structured in the following manner: after an 
overview of the Brazilian judicial system and of the competition law regime 
in Brazil, the problems caused by the growing involvement of the judiciary 
within the Brazilian competition law system will be analyzed. Afterwards, the 
solutions elaborated during the last years by the Brazilian competition 
authorities to solve these problems will be discussed. Finally, answers to the 
questions mentioned at the beginning of this section will be provided in the 
conclusions of the article.  
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE BRAZILIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM  
 
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 established a system of federal 
courts parallel to the States’ ones.10 The lowest federal courts are the Varas 
                                                     
9
 CADE’s Annual Report 2007. Table at page 68. 
The original Portuguese version of the CADE’s annual reports starting from 1996 is 
available at http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?d859db24e827e9401036 (accessed 
on 10th June 2009). 
This large number of cases did not concern exclusively the appeals against the 
decisions of the competition authority sanctioning cartels; it also included the appeals 
against the fines imposed by the competition authority due to the late notification of 
an economic concentration.   
10
 M. T. Aina Sadek., “El Poder Judicial y la Magistratura como Actores Políticos”. In 
L. M. Rodrigues., M. T. Aina  Sadek  (eds.), El Brasil de Lula. Diputados y 
Magistrados. Working paper n.11 (Instituto Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires, 2004) 
27.  
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Federales, the first instance courts. In Brazil there are five federal appelate 
courts (Tribunales Regionales Federales, TRFs), which have jurisdiction over 
five groups of Brazilian States.11 The highest federal courts are the Superior 
Tribunal de Justica (Superior Tribunal of Justice, STJ) and the Supremo 
Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Tribunal, STF). While the STJ is the last 
instance court for the appeals to the judgements of the TRFs on matters of law 
not on the merits, the STF acts as federal constitutional court of Brazil.12  
After decades in which the military dictatorships restricted the human 
rights in the country, the Constitution of 1988 provided a long list of rights,13 
which should be protected by a judiciary system fully isolated from the other 
branches of the State.14 The courts were given full control over their 
administrative functioning, disciplinary affairs and budget.15 According to 
Santiso, “unlike in the rest of the (Latin American) region, the main question 
in Brazil is not whether the judiciary is sufficiently independent, but rather 
whether it has become too independent.”16 Another peculiarity of the 
Brazilian judicial system is the fact that the Constitution of 1988 provided a 
                                                     
11
 The five TRFs are placed in Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Recife and Porto 
Alegre.  
12
 Only a limited number of plaintiffs have access to the STF to directly challenge the 
constitutionality of a federal act: the President of the Republic, the Mesa of the 
Federal Senate and of the Chamber of Representative, the Federal Attorney General, 
the Governor of a Brazilian State, the Federal Lawyers’ Bar, any political party or 
trade union.  
During the 1990s a number of opposition parties have exploited this right by 
challenging every act of the federal government in front of the STF in order to 
postpone the entry into force of the act.  
Supra, M. T. Aina Sadek, 55.  
An English translation of the Brazilian Constitution is available at: 
http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/titleII.html (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
Supra, M. T. Aina Sadek , 55.  
13
 The Constitution of 1988 is a “long” Constitution. In fact, it contains 245 articles. 
Beside the civil individual rights, it provides a list of social rights and collective rights 
(e.g. protection of consumers and environment). Finally, it also contains a number of 
goals which should guide the action of the federal government, which are sometimes 
in contrast (e.g. as mentioned in the previous chapter, the original text of the 
Constitution defended the principle of free competition, but it was also in favour of 
keeping monopoly rights in certain economic sectors).  
Supra, M. T. Aina Sadek , 12-15. 
14
 C. Santiso, “Economic Reform and Judicial Governance in Brazil: Balancing 
Independence with Accountability”. In S. Gloppen , R. Gargarella (eds.), 
Democratization and the Judiciary (Frank Cass, London, 2004) 164.. 
15
 Ibid, 166. 
16
 Ibid,162.    
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broad range of legal actions that an individual may undertake in front of the 
federal courts in order to safeguard its rights.17 In particular, in order to ensure 
the full compliance of the rights enshrined in the Constitution by the federal 
legislations, the judges of the Varas have the power not to apply a federal law 
that they consider unconstitutional.18 Finally, according to Santiso, in order to 
safeguard the autonomy of every judge, the Constitution of 1988 did not 
introduce any form of stare decisis,   even of a vertical nature, causing a de 
facto “balkanization” of the Brazilian judicial system.  Following a 
constitutional amendment adopted in 2004, the STF today can adopt súmulas. 
The latter are summaries of the case law of the STF on a certain issue and 
they are binding for all the courts in Brazil and for the agencies of the public 
administration. This decentralized system slowed down the functioning of the 
Brazilian judicial system.19 As we will see in the following pages, the 
slowness of the Brazilian judicial system has also negative effects on the 
enforcement of competition law in the country.   
 
OVERVIEW OF THE BRAZILIAN SYSTEM OF COMPETITION 
LAW 
Brazil adopted its first competition law in 1962. The law established a 
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE, Administrative 
Council of Economic Law)20 under the Ministry of Justice, in charge of 
investigating cases of cartels and abuses of dominant position. In practice, this 
institution was not active until the beginning of the 1990s. In fact, like in the 
                                                     
17
 For instance, any citizen can file one acción popular with the aim at annulling any 
federal law contrary to the public property, the administrative morality, to the 
environment and historical heritage (Art. 5. LXXIII of the Brazilian Constitution). 
Moreover, any individual or a group of individuals (e.g. political party or trade union) 
can ask one recurso de amparo to block a State’s measure which is illegal or result of 
the abuse of the State’s power (Art. 5. LXIX Brazilian Constitution). 
18
 The Açãos Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade (Acts of Unconstitutional Law) allow 
groups affected by the government’s decisions to submit petitions against federal law 
on constitutional grounds in front of almost any federal court.  
Supra, C. Santiso, 173. 
19
 For instance, between 1988 and 2003 there have been 3097 actions before the STF 
to challenge the constitutionality of federal legislations. During the same period of 
time, the STJ have received 16.493 appeals against the TRFs’ judgements. A gap 
between the cases decided and the new cases submitted started to appear in the 1990s. 
The growing stock of pending cases has slowed down the functioning of the judicial 
system. 
Supra, M. T. Aina Sadek , 50-51.  
20
 Law 4.137, adopted on 10th September 1962. Art. 8 The text of the legislation is 
available at http://www.cade.gov.br/legislacao/4137lei.asp (accessed on 10th June 
2009). 
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majority of the developing countries, for a number of decades the price of the 
majority of goods was agreed by the local producers with the Brazilian 
Government. Moreover, the imports were restricted in order to promote the 
domestic production. Obviously, in such an environment the defence of the 
free competition in the market was not a priority in the country.21 
Within the broad programme of liberalization of the economy 
undertaken in Brazil at the beginning of the 1990s a new competition act, the 
Law 8884/94, was passed.22  Under the new legislation CADE became a 
federal independent agency (autarquia federal),23 composed of a President 
and six Board Members. Under the Law 8884/94, CADE is assisted by two 
advisory bodies: the Secretaria de Direito Econômico (Economic Law Office, 
SDE),24 part of the Ministry of Justice, and the Secretaria de 
Acompanhamento Econômico (Secretariat of Economic Surveillance, SEAE), 
part of the Ministry of Finance. 
 Another important reform brought by the Law 8884/94 was the 
introduction of a system of merger control, absent in the previous 
legislation.25 In the field of merger control, the concentrations have to be 
notified to the SDE and SEAE. The later elaborate a non binding opinion to 
CADE concerning the effect of the transaction in the market, which is in 
charge of taking the final decision.26 On the other hand, in the field of anti-
competitive behaviour SDE conducts the investigations.27 The SDE later 
submits a report to CADE, providing the evidence gathered during the 
investigations. Like in the field of merger control, CADE is the only 
institution in charge of adopting binding decisions for private parties which 
could be appealed to court.  
                                                     
21
 In relation to the role of competition law in Brazil before the reforms of the 1990s 
see: 
C. Monteiro Considera, P. Correa, “The Political Economy of Antitrust in Brazil: 
From Price Control to Competition Policy”. In B. Hawk (ed.), Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute Annual Proceedings, (Juris Publishing, New York, 2001)  533-568.   
22
 Supra, Law n.8884/94. 
For a comment on the Law 8884/94 see: 
 S. Dallal., “Competition Law in Brazil”, (1995) 16 European Competition Law 
Review 255-261. 
23
 Supra, Law n.8884/94, Art.3. 
24
 Supra, Law n.8884/94, Art. 13. 
25
 For a detailed analysis of the Brazilian system of merger control see: 
M. C. Andrade, Controle de Concentrações de Empresas. Estudo da Experiência 
Comunitária e a Aplicação do Artigo 54 da Lei n.8884/94. (Editora Singular, São 
Paulo, 2002). 
26
 Supra, Law n.8884/94, Art. 54(4). 
27
 Supra, Law n. 8884/94, Art. 30. 
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During the second half of the 1990s, CADE was criticized due to the 
long period of time needed to review the notified concentrations, even those 
ones which did not raise any competition concern.28 Few decisions were 
adopted to sanction cartels and other anti-competitive conducts. This situation 
started to change in 2000, when the Law 10.149/00 introduced a system of 
leniency for cartels.29 Following this legislative reform, SDE started to focus 
its enforcement priorities on the detection of cartels. For instance, the number 
of dawn raids conducted by SDE increased from 11 in 2003 to 84 in 2007.30 
The enforcement activities of the SDE in the fight against cartels have been 
recognized also at the international level. For instance, in February 2009 the 
SDE conducted a dawn raid among a group of companies producing cooler 
compressors in São Paulo. Due to the fact that the companies involved in the 
cartel were also foreign companies, the investigations were conducted in close 
cooperation with the Directorate General for the Competition (DG COMP) of 
the European Commission and with the US Department of Justice (DoJ).31 
Finally, in September 2007 CADE adopted the Resolution 46/2007 which 
introduced the possibility to negotiate settlements with the companies 
involved in a cartel case, in order to decrease the time of investigations 
devoted to a single case.32 In order to provide the reader with an idea of the 
growing importance of investigations on anti-competitive conducts in Brazil, 
it is sufficient to mention that while in 2006 SDE sent to CADE 21 cases to be 
                                                     
28
 See for instance, W. H. Page., “Antitrust Review of Mergers in Transition 
Economies: A Comment, with some Lessons from Brazil”, (1997-1998) 66 University 
of Cincinnati Law Review 1124.  
29
 Law n. 10149, adopted on 21st December 2000, which amended the text of the Law 
8884/94. The text of the legislation is available at: 
 http://www.cade.gov.br/legislacao/10149lei.asp (accessed on 10th June 2009).  
30
 SDE’s press release, “SDE Carries out the Largest Dawn Raid in Latin America 
and Fourteen Exectives Were Arrested on Charges of Conspiring to Fix Prices”. 
Published on 29th August 2008. The press release is available at 
http://www.mj.gov.br/main.asp?View={AE70F431-442E-44D0-9303-
65BF6C217A48} (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
31
 SDE’s press release, “Operação internacional conjunta para combate a cartel”. 
Published on 18th February 2009.  
The text of the press release is available at: 
http://www.mj.gov.br/main.asp?ViewID={C39E3B8E-055D-4951-8385-
0BC8DAF63DB2}&params=itemID={37FDC97E-4756-4651-A400-
ABB1E29D1AD0};&UIPartUID={2218FAF9-5230-431C-A9E3-E780D3E67DFE} 
(accessed on 10th June 2009). 
32
 CADE’s Resolution n.46, adopted on 04th September 2007. The text of the 
resolution is available in Portuguese at 
http://www.cade.gov.br/legislacao/resolucoes/Resolucao46.pdf (accessed on 10th 
June 2009). 
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decided, in 2007 this number rose to 90.33 The consequence of this active 
enforcement action of the SDE has been the proliferation of the CADE’s 
decisions to sanction cartels and forms of abuse of dominance, decisions 
which were later appealed to the Brazilian federal courts. 
Under Art. 109 (1) of the Brazilian Constitution, the federal courts 
have jurisdiction to hear the cases where an autonomous Government’s 
agency is involved, both as a plaintiff and as a defendant. As mentioned 
above, CADE is defined under Art. 3 of the Law 8884/94 as an independent 
agency, which has its headquarters in the Federal District of Brasilia. Under 
Art. 64 of the competition act, CADE’s decisions can be executed either at the 
federal courts of the District of Brasilia or at the court with geographic 
jurisdiction over the domicile of the executed party. This implies that the 
appeals to the CADE’s decisions can be heard in any federal court of the 
country. The competition act did not establish a specialized court with 
exclusive jurisdiction in the area of competition law.  
Another institution established by the Law 8884/94 is the CADE’s 
Attorney General (Procuradoria do CADE, ProCADE). The latter plays an 
important role in ensuring the execution of the CADE’s decisions in the 
federal courts.34 The Attorney General takes part to the two monthly plenary 
sessions of CADE (Plenário), but unlike of CADE’s Commissioners he/she 
does not have any right to vote.35 The Attorney General represents CADE in 
the federal courts, both to request the execution of the CADE’s decisions and 
to defend CADE during the proceedings of appeal against its decisions.36 
Finally, the Attorney General provides legal opinions to the CADE’s 
Plenário, if so requested.37  
 
JUDICIARY POWER AND THE COMPETITION LAW IN BRAZIL: 
THE MAIN ISSUES 
An important issue debated today in Brazil concerns the degree of 
judicial review that the federal courts can exercise over the decisions of 
CADE. In Brazil the federal courts can exercise a different degree of review 
                                                     
33
 SDE’s press release, “SDE Sobe no Ranking das Melhores Autoridades de 
Concorrência do Mundo”. Published on 11th June 2008.  
The text of the press release is available at: 
 http://www.mj.gov.br/sde/main.asp?View={DF282882-D0CB-4D38-98C8-
0EA6B037E370}&Team=&params=itemID={2F7AD3F5-9C20-472D-99C4-
05CFF707119F}%3B&UIPartUID={2218FAF9-5230-431C-A9E3-E780D3E67DFE} 
(accessed on 10th June 2009). 
34
 Supra, Law 8884/94, Art. 10. 
35
 Supra, Law 8884/94, Art. 11 (1). 
36
 Supra, Law 8884/94, Art. 10. 
37
 Supra, Law 8884/94, Art. 10 (V).. 
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depending on the nature of the administrative act that they have to review.38 In 
particular, for the atos discricionários (discretionary administrative acts) the 
review should be limited to the compliance by the executive branch with the 
proceedings required by law. On the other hand, when the law defines 
boundaries to the powers of the executive branch to adopt an administrative 
act (actos vinculados), the federal court should exercise a full review of the 
act, including the substance of the decision. The Law 8884/94 did not point 
out whether the decisions of CADE are atos discricionários or vinculados. 
This fault has caused a debate concerning the standard of review that the 
Brazilian federal courts should apply in reviewing the CADE’s decisions. 
Oliveira and Rosas have identified four criteria to define whether an 
administrative act is discricionário rather than vinculados:39 
- The act is adopted on the basis of clear/undetermined legal 
concepts, 
- The administrative act has the value of a technical regulation, 
- The act respects the principles of rationality and proportionality 
and  
- The act is/is not based on a decision of political nature.  
The Brazilian competition act contains a number of not determined 
concepts (e.g. abuse of dominant position, market power…) and CADE 
enjoys a degree of discretion when applying these concepts to the real cases. 
However, according to Oliveira and Rosas the decisions of CADE are usually 
not guided by political considerations. Furthermore, CADE always follows 
the same technical criteria in enforcing the competition act and it binds itself 
to respect the principles of rationality and proportionality. As a consequence, 
the two authors conclude that the decisions of CADE are atos vinculados. 
However, the authors point out that the judicial review exercised by the 
federal courts faces some limitations. In particular, the judges can only check 
whether CADE has correctly exercised its technical discretion in the light of 
the principles of rationality and proportionality, but they cannot contest the 
evaluation on the substance of the case.40 This approach is quite close to that 
one followed during the last years by the CFI in reviewing the European 
Commission’s decision in the field of competition law.41 Though the 
                                                     
38
 G. J. Oliveira., G. Rosas., Direito e Economia da Concorrência (Renovar, São 
Paulo, 2004) 324. 
39
 Ibid, 326. 
40
 Ibid, 328. 
41
 For instance, in the judgement Tetra Laval the ECJ ruled that, although it 
recognized the Commission discretion with regard to the economic assessment of the 
merger, “that does not mean that the Community courts must refrain from reviewing 
the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature” (para. 39). 
C-12/03 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-00987. 
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Procuradoria do CADE still pleads sometimes in the Brazilian federal courts 
that the CADE’s decisions are atos discricionários, this approach has been 
accepted in theory by the majority of the federal judges who had the chance to 
review a decision of CADE.42  
Even though from a theoretical point of view the approach proposed 
by Rosas and Oliveira has been accepted by the majority of the federal courts 
in Brazil, from a practical point of view the federal Varas and the TRFs are 
still reluctant to review the merits of the CADE’s decisions. According to 
Olavo Chinaglia, former competition lawyer in São Paulo and current 
CADE’s Commissioner, the Brazilian courts have been generally quite 
deferent to the decision of the competition authority. In the past, this was due 
to the fact that the federal judges were not comfortable with reviewing the 
application of economic concepts. However, during the last years, the legal 
quality of the decisions of CADE has improved, and thus fewer appeals have 
been successful.43  
An interesting example of judicial review of one of the most relevant 
CADE’s decisions during the last years is the judgement of the 4th Vara of the 
Federal District in the Nestlé-Garoto case.44 After the prohibition of the 
concentration by CADE,45 Nestlé appealed the decision to the first instance 
federal court of Brasilia. Nestlé followed two lines of pleas: on the one hand, 
                                                     
42
 Meeting with José Inácio Gonzaga Franceschini, founding partner in the law firm 
Franceschini & Miranda Adbogados, in São Paulo on 13th June 2008. 
43
 Meeting with Olavo Chinaglia, former competition lawyer in São Paulo and current 
CADE’s Commissioner, on 10th June 2008 in São Paulo. 
44
 Judgement of the 4th federal Vara of the Federal District of Brasilia on 16th March 
2007. Proceedings n. 2005.34.00.015042-8 Ação Ordinária. Nestlé LTDA e Outro v. 
Conselho Administrativo de Defensa Economica. 
The judgements of the Varas of the District of Brasilia are available at: 
http://www.df.trf1.gov.br/inteiro_teor/consulta.php (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
45
 The acquisition of the Brazilian chocolate producer Garoto by Nestlé has been one 
of the most debated merger cases in Brazil during the last years. Due to the fact that 
Nestlé was already present in the Brazilian market before the acquisition of Garoto, 
the horizontal merger would have granted  to Nestlé a market share of 63.10% in the 
Brazilian market for chocolate bars and 88.50% market share for solid chocolate 
toppings. CADE decided to block the acquisition, in spite of the political pressures 
received. Several politicians argued that following the acquisition of Garoto, Nestlé 
would have opened new factories in Brazil and, thus, it would have created new 
possibilities for employment for Brazilian workers. This has been one of the few 
cases of concentrations prohibited by CADE since the introduction of the system of 
merger control in Brazil in 1994. 
OECD Secretariat, Peer Review of the Brazilian Competition Law 2005. 33-34.  
The text of the report is available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/45/35445196.pdf (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
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it argued that the decision of CADE was illegal, due to a number of 
procedural irregularities (e.g. the excessive time of review). On the other 
hand, Nestlé also argued that the decision was irrational and disproportionate 
in relation to the remedy imposed (the prohibition of the acquisition of Garoto 
by Nestlé). Such drastic remedy was contrary to the previous CADE’s case 
law, which had followed a minimum interventionist approach in the past, and 
it had never prohibited any concentration since the introduction of the system 
of merger control in the country in 1994. Therefore, Nestlé suggested in its 
plea that the federal court should conduct a review of the merits of the 
CADE’s decision. However, the judge did not follow this approach and it 
focussed its attention only on the procedural pleas. Under Art. 54 (6) of the 
Law 8884/94, CADE has 60 days to perform the review of the notified 
concentrations. However, in the past CADE not always complied with such 
deadline. In fact, by requesting additional documents to the parties, CADE 
can interrupt the time of review. The time of review of the Nestlé-Garoto case 
was particularly long, 441 days. During the appeal ProCADE argued that the 
case was particularly complex and thus, CADE was right to request additional 
information to the merging parties before taking any decision on the subject. 
On the other hand, Nestlé argued that in some circumstances CADE had 
exercised an excessive discretion in deciding when to stop the time of review. 
For instance, it interrupted several times the time of review in order to allow 
the competitors of Nestlé to submit further evidence against the concentration. 
The judge of the 4th Vara referred to the Brazilian law on administrative 
proceedings.46 Under that law, every administrative act should state the facts 
and the legal grounds “…when it denies, limit or affect the rights or interests” 
of a private party.47 According to the court, the decision of CADE to stop the 
time of review of the concentration had an impact on the interests of Nestlé. 
However, CADE did not state the reasons for which it stopped the time of 
review, and thus its decision breached Art. 54 (6) of the Law 8884/94. The 4th 
Vara declared the concentration approved, instead of sending back the case to 
CADE for a new examination. In fact, under Art. 54 (7) of the competition 
act, a notified concentration is automatically approved if CADE does not 
terminate the time of review within the 60 days. The judge did not go further 
in the analysis; the breach of the time review was a sufficient procedural 
                                                     
46
 Law on Administrative Proceedings n. 9.784 adopted on 29th January 1999.  
An electronic version of the law is available at: 
http://www.jusbrasil.com.br/legislacao/49500/lei-de-procedimento-administrativo-lei-
n-9784-de-29-de-janeiro-de-1999 (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
47
 “Os atos administrativos deverão ser motivados, com indicação dos fatos e dos 
fundamentos jurídicos, quando:I - neguem, limitem ou afetem direitos ou interesses.” 
Ibid, Art. 50 (1). 
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infringement, which saved him from entering into the analysis of the 
substance of the case. The judgement of the 4th Vara stated that the decisions 
of CADE are not free; they have to be based on facts and reasonable 
arguments. As a consequence, the 4th Vara apparently accepted in this 
judgement the interpretation that the decisions of CADE are actos vinculados, 
which require a review on the substance by the federal court. However, the 
judge avoided that kind of analysis. This judgement has been appealed by 
ProCADE to the TRF1, where the case is pending at the moment.48 
Another relevant case of judicial review in the area of merger control 
involved the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD). In 2000 CVRD, a 
corporation operating in the area of production, transportation and distribution 
of minerals in Brazil, notified to CADE the acquisition of the five main steel 
mines in the country.49 CADE cleared the acquisition subject to a number of 
structural and behavioural commitments.50  However, the CADE’s decision 
was appealed to the federal court of Brasilia. In Brazil, in fact, the remedies 
are often imposed on the merging parties by CADE, rather than being 
negotiated with them. This increases the chances that the merging parties will 
appeal the decision to a federal court. The decision of CADE was appealed to 
the federal Vara, then to the TRF1, and finally to the STJ. Before the STJ 
CVRD argued that the decision of CADE was void because it had been 
adopted during a session of the Plenário where only six Commissioners were 
present.51 Three Commissioners voted in favour of the remedies and three 
against. However, the vote of the President of CADE was counted as double 
(the Minerva’s vote). In 2007 the STJ upheld the decision of CADE, by ruling 
that under Art. 49 of the competition act the Minerva’s vote of the President 
                                                     
48
 “Julgamento sobre Compra da Garoto pela Nestlé é Adiado”. JusBrasil, 21st 
January 2009. 
JusBrasil is an online newspaper which provides legal news and access to law and 
case law in Brazil. See http://www.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias (accessed on 10th June 
2009). 
49
 AC n. 08012.000640/2000-09. Companhia Vale do Rio Doce – CVRD e Mineração 
Socoimex S/A. Rélatorio, 1-2. 
50
 The CADE’s decisions required CVRD to divest one of the mines acquired 
(Fresco). Moreover, it required CVRD to delete the exclusivity clauses included in the 
acquisition contract of Casa de Pedro and it restricted the CVRD voting rights in the 
boards of some of the acquired companies.  
Ibid, Acórdão. 
51
 Judgement of the Superior Tribunal de Justicia of 12th September  2007. Recurso 
Especial Nº 966.930 - Df (2007/0156633-6). Companhia Vale Do Rio Doce – CVRD 
v. Conselho Administrativo De Defesa Econômica – CADE. 
The STJ’s judgements are available at: 
http://www.stj.jus.br/SCON/ (accessed on 10th June 2009).  
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of CADE was legitimate when there was parity between the votes of the 
Commissioners.52 The CVRD judgement is not very interesting in relation to 
the interpretation of the competition law carried out by the STJ, an 
interpretation quite obvious by reading the text of the competition act, but 
rather due to the fact that the CVRD decided to go for an appeal to the last 
instance court in Brazil, though both the federal Vara and the TRF1 had 
previously upheld the CADE’s decision. The objective of CVRD was 
probably that one to postpone as long as possible the implementation of the 
CADE’s decision adopted in 2005.53  
It is well known that judges usually have difficulties in reviewing 
merger control decisions, an area of competition law which strongly relies on 
economic analysis. However, also in the area of anti-competitive conducts the 
Brazilian federal judges faced difficulties in analyzing economic concepts 
such as the relevant market and the market dominance. An interesting case of 
judicial review in the area of anti-competitive conducts is the Xerox 
judgement of the TRF 1. The latter is a case of judicial review of one of the 
first CADE’s decisions in the area of abuse of dominance.54 Xerox was one of 
the main producers of photocopy machines in Brazil at the beginning of the 
1990s. At that time the company was used to include in the sale contracts of 
its photocopy machines a tying clause: its clients were bound to purchase the 
toner produced by Xerox if they wanted to receive technical assistance by 
Xerox in case the machines had some technical problem. CADE decided the 
case under the old competition law of 1962.55 In May 2008, the TRF1 upheld 
the CADE’s decision of 1993. In its judgement the court did not carry out any 
detailed analysis of important issues in the area of abuse of dominance, such 
as the definition of relevant market and the concept of dominance. The judge 
relied exclusively on the data contained in the decision of CADE, stating that 
the dominance of Xerox in the market was obvious and it could not be 
challenged.56 The evidence of the abuse was easily confirmed by the sale 
                                                     
52
 Under Art. 8(2) of the Law 8884/94, the President has voting rights in the CADE 
Board meetings, “plus a casting vote”.  
53
 CADE Annual Report 2006, 56. 
54
 TRF 1, V Turma, judgement of 07th May 2008. Apelação Civel 2001.01.00.036741-
1/DF. Xerox do Brasil v. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica.  
55
 Supra, Law 4.137/62, as modified by the Law 8.158/91. Art. 2 
CADE’s decision n. 23/91. 
56
 “The administrative proceedings also showed that Xerox held a dominant position 
in the markets for the supply of technical assistance, with a market share of 91%, and 
in the market for the spare parts for the photocopy machines, with a market share 
from 74% to 100%....It is not discussed the dominant position of Xerox in the market; 
the problem is that this company exercised its dominant position in order to abusively 
restrict the competition.” (“No processo administrativo também provou-se que a 
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contracts which contained the tying clause and had the effect of foreclosing 
any possibility for the competitors of Xerox to increase their market share.57  
The judgements discussed above show the limits of the judicial 
review carried out by the Brazilian federal courts in the area of competition 
law. Though from a theoretical point of view, the federal courts could carry 
out a full review of the decisions of CADE (which are nowadays accepted as 
actos vinculados), they often limit themselves to the review of procedural 
aspects (e.g. the Nestlé-Garoto case) or they strongly rely on the evaluation 
provided by CADE in its decision (e.g. the Xerox case). Therefore, unlike the 
competition law jurisdictions of the developed countries, where the courts are 
active in shaping the enforcement of the competition policy together with the 
NCA,58 the impact of the judicial review on the enforcement of the Brazilian 
competition law is still quite limited.  
A second problem which emerges from the cases of judicial review 
mentioned above is the slowness of the system of judicial review.  For 
instance, the TRF1’s judgement in the case Xerox was decided in May 2008, 
though the CADE’s decision dates back to 1993 when the current competition 
act was not in force yet. Private parties rely on the slow functioning of the 
judicial system in order to postpone as long as possible the execution of the 
decisions of CADE. This was also the strategy pursued by CVRD.  
The excessive reliance on legal recourses by the sanctioned 
companies has also caused a broad mismatch between the amount of fines 
imposed by CADE and the amount of fines which have been effectively paid 
                                                                                                                              
XEROX detém posição dominante nos mercados de locação e prestação de serviços 
de assistência técnica, com uma participação de 91%, bem como no mercado de 
material de consumo para equipamentos de fotocopiadoras, com participação de 74% 
a 100%....Não se discute a posição dominante da XEROX no mercado; o problema é 
esta empresa exercer sua posição dominante para eliminar abusivamente a 
concorrência.”) 
Supra, TRF 1’s judgement in the case Xerox. 
57
 “In this case it has been clearly showed that the anti-competitive conduct of Xerox 
do Brasil had the objective to exclude its competitors, foreclosing the market and thus 
creating a prejudice for the consumer. Such acts are aggravated taking into account 
the dominant position in the market exercised by Xerox.” (“No caso em tela, ficou 
claramente comprovado que a conduta anticoncorrencial da Xerox do Brasil tem o 
condão de eliminar seus concorrentes, conduzindo a um verdadeiro açambarcamento 
de mercado em conseqüente prejuízo ao consumidor. Tais fatos agravam-se levando-
se em conta a posição dominante no mercado exercida pela Xerox.”) 
58
 Beside the case of the US courts, also the ECJ and the CFI have started during the 
last years to perform an active review of the European Commission’s decisions in the 
area of merger control. See, for instance, the CFI’s judgement in Airtours (T-342/99), 
in Schneider Electric (T-310/01), General Electric (T-210/01) and the ECJ’s 
judgements in Tetra Laval (C-12/03).  
  
 
21 
by the companies. Sanctioned companies usually request not to pay the 
amount of the fine during the time of appeal by claiming a potential periculum 
in mora: the company would be damaged if it had paid in advance the fine 
imposed by CADE on the basis of a decision which could be later reversed by 
the court of appeal. For instance, between 2002 and 2004 CADE imposed 
fines for a total amount of 16.7 million Real, but it only collected 632.770,00 
Real, equivalent to 3.78% of the fines imposed.59 According to Pagotto, the 
great delay in the enforcement of CADE’s decisions reduces the credibility of 
persuasion of the enforcement efforts of this institution.60 The author asks 
himself the following question: “would a company be persuaded not to 
commit a violation (of the competition law)… if it was known in advance that 
there was a 50 % chance of success?”61  
Another problem which has undermined the enforcement of the 
CADE’s decision is the identification of the court which has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal. As mentioned above, under the competition act of 1994 
appeals against CADE’s decisions may be initiated either in Brasilia or in the 
federal court of the State where the party involved is domiciled. Although the 
majority of the appeals are usually brought in Brasília, there have been some 
cases of appeals brought in other federal courts. For instance, some of the 
companies involved in the cartel case of the vigilantes (companies providing 
security services)62 in the State of Rio Grande do Sul appealed the CADE’s 
decision to the local Vara of that State, and then to the TRF4.63 If the federal 
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 Supra, CADE’s Annual Report 2006, 55. 
60
 L. U. Pagotto., “Are the Brazilian Competition Authorities Being Responsive? An 
Analysis Based on the Benign Big Gun Model”. (2006) 29, 2 World Competition 285-
314. 
61
 Ibid, 311. 
62
 The case of vigilantes concerned a group of companies providing security services 
in the State of Rio Grande do Sol. The companies established a bid rigging cartel in 
order to coordinate their bids when they participated to private and public calls for 
tender. The case is relevant because it was the first cartel case decided by CADE in 
September 2007 under the leniency procedure introduced in 2000 (CADE’s decision 
n. 08012.001826/2003-10). 
For further information concerning the CADE’s decision see: 
M. O. Lubambo de Melo, “La Decisión del CADE en el Cartel de las Empresas de 
Vigilancia”. (2008) 24, Boletin Latinoamericano de Competencia 19-24. 
63
 Three companies involved in the cartel, EBV, MOBRA and EPAVI requested the 
TRF4 to block the payment of the fine during the judicial proceedings due to 
periculum in mora. The requests have been rejected by the chambers of the TRF4 
which reviewed the case. 
TRF 4, Agravos de Instrumento nº 2007.04.00.003701-7, 2007.04.00.003696-7 and 
2007.04.00.031248-0. EBV, 
MOBRA and EPAVI v. Conselho Administrativo de Defensa Econômica.  
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judges in Brasilia are not very comfortable to deal with competition law, such 
a problem is even more evident for the judges of other Brazilian States who 
only exceptionally have to review cases involving the application of the 
competition.  
A final issue which emerged during the last years was of a procedural 
nature: most of the appeals against the CADE’s decisions sanctioning cartels 
were treated by the Brazilian federal courts as separated, rather than joint 
appeals. If this element is taken in consideration together with the fact that 
both the appeals in the federal courts in Brasilia and in the State of residence 
of the party are possible, this fact increases the likeness of diverging 
judgements concerning the same CADE’s cartel decision. 
 
THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED   
 
During the last years four kind of initiatives have been undertaken by 
CADE, ProCADE and by the Brazilian federal courts in order to solve the 
problems mentioned above. These initiatives indeed tackle some of the 
problems, such as the risk that the slowness of the Brazilian judicial system 
may hamper the execution of the CADE’s decisions. On the other hand, these 
solutions neither fully tackle the issue of the quality of the judicial review 
carried out by the Brazilian federal courts, nor the problem of the conflicts of 
jurisdiction among the appeal courts. 
The first initiative was a re-organization of the structure and of the 
tasks of ProCADE. CADE’s Resolution n. 41 of 2005 modified the internal 
organization of CADE’s Attorney General.64 A new department of ProCADE 
in charge of taking care that the fines imposed by CADE were effectively paid 
was established by the Resolution (Seção de Dívida Ativa e Precatórios).65 
                                                                                                                              
The judgements of the TRF 4 are available at: 
http://www.trf4.jus.br/trf4/ (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
64
 Originally ProCADE was divided in three departments: the Coordenadoria de 
Estudos e Pareceres (in charge of providing opinions to CADE in the concentration 
cases), the Coordenadoria de Processos Administrativos (it provided to CADE 
opinions concerning anti-competitive conducts and on a number of administrative 
decisions, like in the area of the public procurement competitions organized by 
CADE) and the Coordenadoria do Contencioso (in charge of representing CADE in 
front of the federal courts).  
CADE’s Annual Report 2001, 156. 
65
 CADE’s Resolution n. 41, adopted on 14.09.2005. Art. 13. The Resolution has been 
abrogated by the Resolution n. 45 adopted on 28.03.2007, which consolidates in one 
text a number of previous CADE’s Resolutions.  
The text of the Resolution is available at: 
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Moreover, in 2007 ProCADE concluded an agreement of technical 
cooperation with the SDE.66 Under the terms of the agreement, in the merger 
cases which can be decided under the fast track procedure the ProCADE will 
submit an opinion to the Plenário of CADE concerning the payment of the 
filing fees by the merging parties and the compliance of the time of 
notification and other procedural formalities. Therefore, under the terms of the 
agreement, the ProCADE bound itself not to provide an additional opinion to 
CADE, in addition to the opinions from SDE and SEAE. This solution had the 
objective to avoid the overlaps among the legal opinions provided to CADE 
by these advisory bodies in the most simple merger cases. As a consequence, 
the merger review procedure would be speed up and ProCADE would be able 
to focus its limited human resources in representing CADE before the federal 
courts.  
In order to speed up the appeal proceedings, ProCADE has also 
started to promote some court settlements with the companies sanctioned by 
CADE. The legal basis to conclude court settlement is provided by Art. 10 
(IV) of the Law 8884/94. The later mentions among the tasks of ProCADE 
that one to conclude court settlements with the sanctioned parties, subject to 
the prior approval of the Plenário of CADE. The first court settlement was 
negotiated by ProCADE in the case Microsoft-TBA.67 CADE sanctioned the 
agreement of exclusive distribution concluded by Microsoft with TBA 
Informática, a retailer of software in the Federal District of Brasilia.68 The 
appeal proceedings would have been lengthy and only after several years the 
decision of CADE would have been enforced (see the case Xerox). The court 
                                                                                                                              
http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?e344c44bd130f0491e3f (accessed on 10th June 
2009). 
66
 Agreement of technical cooperation concluded between SDE and ProCADE on 19th 
July 2007. 
The text of the agreement is available at:  
http://www.mj.gov.br/main.asp?ViewID={5C394253-B7F9-4E89-974E-
CA56AC72DEBA}&params=itemID={827D7C2F-4E7C-4BF8-ABEF-
6E45CC39F971};&UIPartUID={2868BA3C-1C72-4347-BE11-A26F70F4CB26} 
(accessed on 10th June 2009). 
67
 CADE’s Annual Report 2006, 85. 
68
 The case involved the system of exclusive distribution established by Microsoft in 
Brazil. Microsoft had chosen TBA as the sole distributor of its software in the Federal 
District of Brasilia. As a consequence of the exclusivity agreement, a competitor of 
TBA, IOS  Informática Organização e Sistemas Ltda., was excluded by the calls for 
tenders to provide computers to the federal agencies based in Brasilia, which required 
the Microsoft operating system to be installed in their computers. In 2004 CADE 
condemned the exclusivity clause and it imposed a fine on the companies.  
See the CADE’s decision in the case. PA n. 08012.008024/98-49. Rélatorio, 1-2. 
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settlement promoted by ProCADE simplified and accelerated the enforcement 
mechanism.  
CADE has also tried to promote the understanding of the competition 
law among the federal judges. In fact, since 2004 it has organized periodical 
workshops concerning competition law for the judges of the Federal District.69 
This initiative can help the federal judges to become more acquainted with 
competition law concepts. On the other hand, these events only involve the 
federal judges of the capital, who usually have to review the majority of the 
competition law cases. A future challenge for CADE will be to involve the 
federal judges of other Brazilian States in this kind of initiatives. 
Finally, the federal courts have accepted the principle that the 
appellants are required to lodge the amount of the fine imposed by CADE in a 
temporary bank account held by the court. Art. 65 of the Law 8884/94 clearly 
provides this kind of obligation. However, when the first cartel case decided 
by CADE was appealed (the steel cartel case),70 the federal court did not 
require the companies to comply with such an obligation.71 The court argued 
that the deposit of the fine in a temporary account would create per se a 
periculum in mora for the appellants. Following a judgement of the STJ in 
2003 this is not the practice anymore.72 Although pleas claiming the 
periculum in mora of the temporary deposit of the fine are still presented at 
the federal courts in Brazil by the sanctioned companies, these pleas are 
usually rejected by the courts.73  
 
CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR OTHER EMERGING ECONOMIES 
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 CADE’s Annual Report 2004, 74. 
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 The case involved a price-fixing cartel established between the Companhia 
Siderúrgica Nacional, Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista and Usinas Siderúrgica de 
Minas Gerais. SDE started the investigations on the case in 1999. CADE took its 
decision sanctioning the companies on 14th April 2004. 
PA n. 08012.005924/2000-30. 
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 CADE’s Annual Report 2006, 56. 
72
 Judgement of the STJ, Recurso Especial nº 590.960 - DF (2003/0169770-6), 
submitted by the UNIMED Campinas Cooperative de Trabalho Médico. 
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 For instance, one of the preliminary judgements of the TRF4 in the case of 
vigilantes mentioned above, requested the appellant to comply with the obligation 
provided by Art. 65 of the Law 8884/94 by referring to the STJ judgement of 2003 in 
the case UNIMED. 
Judgement of TRF4 of 18th September 2008. EBV Empresa Brasileira de Vigilancia 
LTDA c. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica – CADE. Agravo de 
Instrumento n. 2007.04.00.003701-7/SC. 
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The re-organization of ProCADE, the introduction of court 
settlements, workshops for the federal judges and the obligation for the 
sanctioned companies to lodge in a temporary bank account the amount of the 
fine, have solved some of the problems mentioned in the previous section. 
The rationale behind these initiatives was to avoid that the judicial review 
carried out by the Brazilian federal courts become an obstacle to the 
enforcement of the competition law in the country. During the last years, 
CADE/SDE/SEAE have improved the quality and the speed of their technical 
analysis and they have strengthened their independence from the executive 
branch. The Brazilian competition authorities are recognized today as one of 
the best NCAs among the non-OECD countries.74 On the other hand, the 
judiciary has not followed the same evolution of these technical bodies. The 
fact that private parties may exploit the slowness of the judicial proceedings in 
order to postpone as long as possible the execution of the administrative 
decision is an institutional problem faced by the majority of the emerging 
economies which have started to enforce actively a system of competition 
law. The four initiatives mentioned in the previous section had the objective 
to solve this issue. However, these initiatives aimed at solving this issue by 
limiting the scope of judicial review by the Brazilian federal courts; they 
aimed at improving mainly the speed, rather than the quality of the review. 
This was the underlining logic behind the introduction of the court settlement 
and the obligation for the private parties to submit the temporary payment of 
the fine. Due to the existence of court settlements, the tribunal looses its duty 
to review the NCA’s decision. The latter becomes the exclusive enforcer of 
the competition law. A European lawyer would probably agree with the idea 
that the temporary deposit of the fine in the account of the court may damage 
the presumption of innocence of the private parties during the legal 
proceedings. In Brazil, on the other hand, the need to protect the presumption 
of innocence comes at a second stage in comparison to the need to guarantee a 
full and prompt execution of the decisions of the NCA. The quality and the 
speed of the judicial review seem two opposite goals, which are difficult to 
reconcile in an emerging economy like Brazil.  
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 For instance, the enforcement activities of the SDE against cartels have been prized 
by the Global Antitrust Review, law review published by the International Bar 
Association, in June 2008.  
SDE’s press release, “SDE Sobe no Ranking das Melhores Autoridades de 
Concorrência do Mundo”. Published on 11.06.2008.  
The text of the press release is available at: 
 http://www.mj.gov.br/sde/main.asp?View={DF282882-D0CB-4D38-98C8-
0EA6B037E370}&Team=&params=itemID={2F7AD3F5-9C20-472D-99C4-
05CFF707119F}%3B&UIPartUID={2218FAF9-5230-431C-A9E3-E780D3E67DFE} 
(accessed on 10th June 2009). 
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In relation to the question concerning the standard of review applied 
by the courts in reviewing the decisions of the NCA, the Brazilian case shows 
that this debate is still rather theoretical discussion in the majority of the 
emerging economies. The judgements analyzed above showed that the judges 
of the emerging economies try to escape from the task of reviewing the 
decision of the NCA. They tend to limit their analysis to the compliance of the 
procedural aspects by the NCA, even though the scope of their review could 
be broader (see the Nestlé-Garoto judgement). Alternatively, the judges 
confirm the assessment of the NCA without any critical evaluation of the 
economic evidence brought by the latter (see the Xerox judgement). From this 
point of view, the workshops organized during the last years in Brazil for the 
federal judges does not seem to be very successful to solve this issue.  
The four initiatives mentioned above have not tackled the second 
issue discussed in the previous section: the conflicts of jurisdiction among the 
different appellate courts. One solution which could solve this problem would 
be the introduction of one federal court with exclusive jurisdiction to hear all 
the appeals to the CADE’s decisions. Some emerging economies have opted 
for this kind of solution. For instance, the South Africa Competition Act of 
1998 introduced a Competition Tribunal75 and a Competition Appeal Court.76 
These courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals to the decisions of 
the Competition Commission. The single appeal court is a good institutional 
solution because it ensures that fully qualified judges revise the decisions of 
the NCA. For instance, in South Africa every judge of the Competition 
Tribunal and of the Competition Appeal Court have a background in law and 
economics. 77 However, this kind of solution is valuable only in countries 
where a sufficient number of competition law cases are judged every year, 
which is not the case in the majority of the developing countries. Even in 
South Africa up to date there are few cases which have been appealed to the 
Competition Appeal Court. In fact, like in the majority of the emerging 
economies, during the first years of its activities, the Competition 
Commission focussed its enforcement priorities in the field of merger control. 
As a consequence, few decisions have been appealed to the Competition 
Tribunal and only a limited number of cases were appealed to the Competition 
Appeal Court. The growing number of appeals to the decisions of CADE 
during the last few years shows that this country would be ready for the 
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 South Africa Competition Act, law n.89, published on the Official Journal on 30th 
October 1998, notice n.1392. Art. 26. The text of the legislation is available at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
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 Ibid, Art. 36  
77
 Ibid, Art. 28 and Art. 36(2). 
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introduction of such a specialized court.78 Due to the fact that during the first 
years of the existence of the competition law few decisions of the NCA are 
appealed to court, a competition appelate court could be established at a later 
stage in comparison to the NCA. In addition, in some civil law countries, like 
Brazil, there could be procedural obstacles to the establishment of a 
specialized competition tribunal similar to that one existent in South Africa. 
An alternative solution could be to grant exclusive jurisdiction to one chamber 
of the tribunal which has jurisdiction to hear every appeal against the 
administrative decisions of the competition authority. For instance, the Italian 
competition act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Regional Administrative 
Tribunal of Lazio (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale del Lazio, TAR) over 
the appeals against the decisions of the Italian competition authority (Autorità 
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AGCM).79 The TAR’s judgements 
can be appealed exclusively to the Italian Supreme Administrative Court 
(Consiglio di Stato, CdS).80 During the last years every appeal against the 
decisions of the competition authority was always analyzed by the same 
chamber within these courts, namely the first chamber of TAR, and the sixth 
chamber of the CdS. Consequently, even if these chambers are not specialized 
competition tribunals like those ones of South Africa, these chambers have 
developed during the last years an expertise in the field of competition law. 
Their judgements have clarified some unclear aspects of the Italian 
competition act,81 and the quality of their judicial review has improved over 
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 Such solution was already proposed in 2004 by Carlos Ragazzo, former head of 
SEAE and current CADE’s Commissioner. However, at the time Ragazzo argued that 
the number of appeals to the decisions of CADE was still too limited to justify the 
establishment of a specialized appeal court in the field of competition law.  
C. Ragazzo, “The Standing of the Competition Administrative Authorities – The 
Judiciary in Brazil”. (2004) 18,  Boletino Latinoamericano de Competencia 37-39.  
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 Italian law n. 287, adopted on 10th October 1990. Article n. 33(1). 
The text of the legislation is available at: 
http://www.agcm.it/ (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
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 http://www.giustizia-amministrativa.it/ (accessed on 10th June 2009). 
81
 For instance, through its case law the CdS has limited the involvement of the 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in the enforcement of the competition act. 
Under Art. 20 of the Law 287/1990, the Italian NCA should ask the opinion of the 
competent NRA when the competition law investigations concerned a regulated 
sector. For instance, in the judgement 5640/2002 the CdS ruled that the AGCM could 
undertake investigations on anti-competitive conducts involving banks and insurance 
companies, even though Art. 20(2) of the Law 287/1990 provided that in the banking 
sector the Bank of Italy enforced the competition law. According to the CdS, due to 
the fact that the present case concerned an agreement between banks and insurances, 
the overlapping jurisdiction of the AGCM and of the Bank of Italy could lead to 
diverging results. Due to the fact that the jurisdiction of the Bank of Italy within the 
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the years. After a first phase in which the TAR and the CdS upheld every 
decision of the competition authority without entering into the merits of the 
decision, today the TAR and the CdS review aspects such as the correct 
definition of the relevant market and of the market power by the competition 
authority.82 This improvement was achieved due to the fact that the judges of 
the same chamber reviewed every decision of the AGCM appealed to court. 
Even though there are important differences between the Brazilian and the 
Italian legal systems (e.g. in Brazil there is no system of administrative courts) 
a number of lessons could be drawn from the Italian experience. In the 
countries where the establishment of a specialized competition tribunal would 
not be feasible, due to the procedural problems or due to the excessive costs 
connected with the establishment such an institution, an alternative solution 
could consist in granting exclusive jurisdiction to one court already present in 
the country and within this tribunal every appeal against the NCA’s decisions 
should be judged by the same chamber.  
The case of Brazil is a good example of the problems which may rise 
in an emerging economy where competition law starts to be actively enforced 
by the local NCA and where, as a consequence, the judiciary becomes more 
involved in the enforcement of the competition law. The main issues which 
can rise are related to the low quality of the judgements of the appeal courts, 
the conflicts of jurisdiction among different appeal courts and the slowness of 
the judicial proceedings, which may hamper the execution of the NCA’s 
decisions. The initiatives undertaken in Brazil during the last years mainly 
aimed at solving the last problem. However, the acceleration of the time of 
judicial review does not improve the quality of the judgements and it may put 
at risk the presumption of innocence of the defendant during the judicial 
proceedings. This article has argued that the problems mentioned above could 
only be solved effectively through the establishment of a specialized appellate 
court with jurisdiction on every appeal against the NCA’s decisions. 
Obviously, such a solution should be evaluated in the light of the procedural 
                                                                                                                              
competition act was an exception to the general rule which granted exclusive 
jurisdiction to the AGCM to enforce the competition act, in that case the competence 
of the Bank of Italy should be excluded. This case law was important; in fact in 2006 
the Law 287/1990 was amended and Article 20(2) of the Law 287/1990 was 
abrogated, by thus eliminating any competence of the Bank of Italy in enforcing the 
competition act.   
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 Initially the CdS and the TAR reviewed the compliance by the AGCM of the 
procedural requirements provided by the competition act. This situation changed with 
the judgement of the CdS 2199/2002. Following the case law of the ECJ and of the 
CFI, in this judgement the CdS stated for the first time that the duty of the 
administrative judge was that one to verify the truthfulness of the facts relied as 
evidence by the AGCM and to check the logicality of the AGCM’s decision.  
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rules present in every country. Moreover, due to the low number of decisions 
adopted by the NCA during the first years of existence of the competition law, 
this institution could be established at a later stage in comparison to the NCA. 
Only when the NCA starts to actively enforce the competition law, the cost of 
establishment of such a specialized court may be justified by the higher 
number of appeals to the NCAs’ decisions. Alternatively, the identification of 
a chamber within a tribunal not specialized in competition law could also be a 
feasible solution.  
 
